Many scientists have criticized Rushton's application of a hypothesis about r-and K-selection to putative human racial differences (e.g., Cain & Vanderwolf, 1990; Lynn, 1989a Lynn, , 1989b Silverman, 1990; Weizmann, Wiener, Wiesenthal, & Ziegler, 1990; Zuckerman & Brody, 1988) . The criticisms of Rushton's theoretical approach by Weizmann et al. are certainly appropriate, but they were not sufficiently forceful in asserting the fact that Rushton's approach misses the point of r-and K-selection: It ignores ecological processes and assumptions that are central to the concept. The r/K model is a valid context for interpreting human life history characteristics only if the investigator is prepared to study these ecological processes and assumptions in well-defined human populations. As an ecologist by training, I hope to show in this commentary what the r/K model implies ecologically, what would be necessary to apply it properly to human populations, and how Rushton's investigations are incompatible with appropriate use of the r/K model. I do not imagine that psychologists will share my degree of concern over the inappropriate use of ecological theory in this context. It would seem at first glance that my criticism of Rushton's research could be satisfied if he simply removed all attempts at evolutionary explanation from his racial comparisons. However, I will demonstrate an additional point that should still trouble psychologists: Even if this research were reworked without the claims to evolutionary legitimacy, its empirical flaws would remain unremedied. Basic methodological considerations apply to these racial comparisons irrespective of their context, whether is it biology, anthropology, psychology, or sociology.
MacArthur & Wilson, 1967) has been both fruitful and badly misused in the history of ecology (Boyce, 1984) . The model's basic tenet, that the dynamics of a population may influence the evolution of life history characteristics, is still far from proven (Ricklefs, 1990, p. 578 ) despite 20 years of research. It is difficult for a scientist outside the field to appreciate all the variations and extrapolations that have been drawn from the model. Unfortunately Rushton has attempted to apply to human races a variation (Pianka, 1970) , which has been widely published but is overgeneralized, poorly supported empirically, and depends on doubtful implicit assumptions (Boyce, 1984) . The resulting publications (e.g., Rushton 1988a Rushton , 1988b Rushton , 1989 Rushton & Bogaert, 1987 have given the misleading impression to non-ecologists that Rushton's racial comparisons are legitimized by evolutionary ecological theory; in fact, they are not.
The r/K model is properly used to describe how natural selection might act on life history characteristics when the agent of selection is classified as acting in either a density-dependent or densityindependent fashion (Boyce, 1984) . Ecologists describe an agent of natural selection or population regulation as acting in a "density-dependent" fashion when its effects increase as population density increases. Food supply, endemic infectious disease, and predation often act in a densitydependent fashion. "Density-dependent" is used to describe natural selection when its effects are independent of population density. Temperature extremes, drought, or flooding often act in a density-independent fashion.
The r/K model was based originally (MacArthur, 1962 (MacArthur, , 1972 MacArthur & Wilson, 1967) on the relationship between two parameters of the logistic model of population dynamics -a model in which population growth over time is described by an S-shaped curve because the population eventually encounters some factor that limits it. The concepts of density dependence and independence are inextricably linked to the parameters of the logistic model, "r" and "K".
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The parameter "r" represents the rate of population growth in a given environment, when there are no density-dependent limitations on population growth. "K" refers to the "carrying capacity" of the environment for that population -the population density beyond which it does not grow because it is limited by some factor or factors that act in a density-dependent fashion. "K-selection" is a process of natural selection in which the agent of selection acts in a densitydependent way. "r-selection" is a process of natural selection in which the agent of selection acts in a density-independent way. K-selection is expected to favour genotypes that can persist and increase at high density (thus increasing K), while r-selection is expected to favour genotypes that increase most quickly at low densities (thus increasing r).
There is a third important class of natural selection associated with population parameters, "alpha-selection", which is selection for competitive ability (e.g., territoriality, aggression) (Boyce, 1984; Krebs, 1978) . Like K-selection, alpha-selection also increases in intensity at high densities, but it can also operate at low densities. Instead of favouring genotypes that persist and increase at high density, it favours genotypes that, owing to their negative effects on others, often reduce the growth rate and the maximum population size. (See Table 1 for a summary of these three types of natural selection.)
Implications for Rushton 's racial comparisons
Little in any of Rushton's publications on r/K theory and racial differences bears any relationship to these well-defined processes of natural selection. In fact, the central concepts of r-and K-selection (population dynamics, and degree of density dependence of natural selection) are conspicuous by their absence from Rushton's work. This is a critical oversight because these concepts dictate many aspects of research design. The examples below demonstrate how Rushton's failure to attend to the central concepts has led to circularity in hypothesis testing, internal contradictions in theoretical approach, and methodological inadequacy.
1. Methods for studying r-and K-selection. To generate valid predictions from the r/K model the following steps are required. (Stearns, 1977 and Boyce, 1984 discuss further the requirements for sound methodology in studies of r-and Kselection.) a. Specify a well-defined local population. b. Understand its population dynamics in the habitat in which the natural selection is hypothesized to have occurred.
c. Identify agents of natural selection and determine whether they act in a density dependent (K-selecting) or density independent (rselecting) fashion. Alpha-selection (frequency dependent selection for competitive ability) must also be considered.
d. Test predictions about the effects of these agents of natural selection on particular life history characteristics.
Rushton has done none of these things in any of his publications on racial differences and the r/K model.
Unit of analysis:
The population is the only appropriate unit of analysis for the r/K model, by definition, because r, K, and density dependence are undefined outside the context of a population. A population ("race population" or "local race") is "a breeding population adapted to local selection pressures and maintained by either natural or social barriers to gene interchange" (Nelson & Jurmain, 1985, p. 193) . Mayr (1963) labels these groups "local populations" or "demes". This is clearly the unit to which demographic analysis can be applied.
In contrast, human races ("geographical races", Nelson & Jurmain, 1985, p. 193 ) are made up of many separate local populations (Nelson & Jurmain, 1985, p. 193) , each of which has occupied a specific habitat and ecological niche and therefore has experienced its own selection pressures.
Entire races of humans are not local populations or demes; therefore the r/K model makes no predictions about entire current human races.
The r/K model has been applied to larger groups than populations in other species (Boyce, 1984; Stearns, 1977) , but this is appropriate only when we can assume that all populations of the larger grouping experience the same densitydependent or -independent selection pressures on life history traits. For many species, this may be a reasonable assumption, but for humans it is not. Human populations occupy many different ecological niches, and populations must be considered separately until it is shown that they are similar with respect to agents of selection on life history traits.
Rushton himself has made another strong argument against the analysis of racial groups, in o Individual characteristics that increase survival and reproduction at high population densities; result in increased K (maximum population size) Individual characteristics that improve ability to limit access of others to resources (e.g., territoriality); result in decreased r and/or K arguing for high heritabilities for the life history traits he measures (e.g., Rushton & Bogaert, 1988) . Given the fact that all racial groups include numerous distinct populations that have colonized a variety of new environments in the last 20,000 years, non-zero heritabilities imply that each subgroup would have the potential to move away from the ancestral average as it occupied new environments with new selection pressures.
To get an idea of the kind of within-racial group divergence we might expect in only 10,000 years (500 generations), we apply the formula for response to selection differentials R = h 2 *S where R is the response to selection of the population mean in SD units, h 2 is the heritability of the trait, and S is the difference between the mean of the population and the mean of the reproducing parents, also in SD units (Falconer, 1960) . If h 2 of the trait is 0.3 (Mousseau & Roff, 1987) and S is 0.01 (a moderate selection pressure), the population mean can be expected to have changed by 1.5 SD units at the end of 500 generations, or 10,000 years. Therefore, on the basis of Rushton's own suggestions about heritability, we must assume that populations within races have been substantially free to adapt to their particular ecological circumstances. The mean of any population is more likely to reflect its history of the last 10,000 years than to preserve the more distant ancestral conditions of that racial group.
3. Generalizing to races. Because local populations are the only appropriate units of analysis for r-or K-selection by definition, any generalizations to entire races must involve proper sampling of the populations assigned to a racial group. The requirements for unbiased sampling are the same here as in any other scientific study -all units must be equally likely to be sampled, the units must be independent of one another, and sampling must be either random or systematic. If there were a good reason for studying racial groups rather than populations, an investigator would have to do the following to generate valid generalizations: a. Make a list of all distinct local populations of each racial group (Nelson & Jurmain, 1985, p. 193) , or use a standardized list of distinct societies such as the Standard Cross Cultural Sample (Murdock & White, 1980) . b. Sample randomly or systematically from the list (Murdock & White, 1980 , suggest several methods for doing so). No local population is to be sampled more than once.
c. In a statistical analysis, each sampled populations provides one datum (i.e., the mean of the population for the trait in question). The sample size is then the number of distinct local populations that have been studied.
d. In analyzing these data, it would be important to distinguish among several factors that might influence life history traits. This might be done with a 2-way analysis of covariance: The covariates would be population means for life history traits and density dependence of the natural selection, while grouping variables would be race and some measure of ecological niche.
Importance of original habitat.
Populations studied in an analysis of r-or K-selection should be living in the habitat in which the selection is hypothesized to have operated. Therefore, data from the following types of populations are often misleading: those that have recently migrated to new habitat (e.g., all North Americans except Amerindians), those whose habitat has recently been radically altered (e.g., most Amerindians), and those who have experienced strong "unnatural" selection in the process of being exploited by other populations (e.g., AfroAmericans). Data from these populations should not be included in the analysis. There are two reasons for this. First, it is impossible to know what selection pressures operated historically on their life history traits, and whether their action was density-dependent or density-independent, without detailed knowledge of the population's dynamics in its ancestral habitat. Second, data on life history traits measured in new or recently altered environments are often inappropriate for understanding the adaptive role of the traits in their original environment, because of genotypeenvironment interactions.
Most of Rushton's racial comparisons have been given as verbal summaries or heavily abridged tables from other sources, rather than a more rigorous meta-analysis. He provides no evidence that he or the studies cited have sampled the populations of the races in an unbiased way (Point 3 above), or that the populations were studied in the habitat in which the hypothesized natural selection took place (Point 4 above). Readers should keep in mind, whenever Rushton suggests that there is a difference between races in some trait hypothesized to result from differential r-or K-selection, that his sample size for that comparison should be the number of ecologically distinct populations studied.
Specific selection pressures.
It is impossible to predict what life history traits will be favoured by any kind of selection unless you know what particular ecological factors influence life history traits in the specific population under consideration and have a model of how they function (Boyce, 1984) . Different agents of r-selection will produce different selection pressures, as will different agents of K-selection. This is a crucial point, especially because, for controversial traits like intelligence and rulefollowing, Rushton does not have even the guidance of Pianka (1970) for placing them on the assumed continuum; they are absent from Pianka's table. In fact, in the absence of detailed information about the ancestral ecology of the populations he is comparing, Rushton has no basis whatsoever for making predictions about these traits. The following example shows how different agents of r-or K-selection might influence intelligence:
a. Suppose population A is regulated by endemic infectious disease. Endemic infectious disease imposes density-dependent mortality, so it is generally an agent of K selection. Individuals with high intelligence would tend to be favoured under such a regime because of their understanding of hygiene and ability to discover and use medicinal herbs.
b. Suppose the members of population B experience high mortality during severe winter storms. Severe winter storms would be agents of r selection because they impose densityindependent mortality. Individuals with high intelligence would tend to be favoured under such a regime because of their ability to design and build good shelters and use fire.
Thus, both r-and K-selecting agents can favour high intelligence.
With respect to social rule-following, Rushton's predictions in the absence of ecological information are equally unjustified. First, note that agents of r-selection are unlikely to influence social rule-following at all, because they act independently of the density of the population. In contrast, we do expect agents of K-selection to influence rule-following, but rule-following will be favoured only in situations where there is no advantage to cheating. Consider the following two populations:
c. Suppose population C is also regulated by endemic infectious disease. Endemic infectious disease imposes density-dependent mortality, so it is generally an agent of K selection. In this case, individuals who violate rules of hygiene will be harmed, and rule-following behaviour will be favoured.
d. Suppose population D is regulated by limited food, which imposes density-dependent mortality and therefore is generally an agent of K selection, too. However, individuals can gain an advantage by violating rules of foodsharing, eating tabooed foods, or refusing to offer prescribed sacrifices of food to the gods, so this is a case in which K-selection would favour rule-breaking. Thus, in the absence of information about specific agents of natural selection, general predictions about the resulting traits, such as Rushton's, are unjustified.
6. Alpha-selection. Inclusion of alpha-selection (selection for competitive ability) in a model of selection pressures on life history and behavioural traits casts additional doubt on any attempt to force the processes onto a onedimensional continuum (Boyce, 1984) . Given the extraordinary ability of some human populations to extinguish other human populations and other species, it seems reasonable to assume that alphaselection has been important in human evolution. If Rushton ignores alpha-selection in his interpretation of the evolutionary origin of human traits, he must provide some empirical justification for doing so.
Assumption of a unidimensional continuum.
K-selection and r-selection do not operate on a one-dimensional continuum (MacArthur, 1972, p. 228) , as assumed by Rushton. The possibility of additional classes of natural selection such as alpha-selection (Point 6 above) alone is sufficient cause to question the r/K model's "prediction" of an "ordering" of individuals or groups. In addition, the influence of agents of r-or Kselection on life history traits is not necessarily opposite, as assumed by Rushton (Boyce, 1984; MacArthur, 1972, p. 229 ).
8. Independent variables. Like many hypotheses, Rushton's involves the relationship between two sets of variables (Table 1) : The independent variables are direct indicators of r-or K-selection (e.g., the degree of density dependence of the selection processes in each population studied). The dependent variables are the life history, behavioural, and personality characteristics of the populations. To test a hypothesis of this kind, scientists usually measure both the independent and dependent variables across a range of values and then assess their relationship by statistical methods. Rushton's approach, to test predictions about patterns among the dependent variables while ignoring the independent variables, borders on circularity and at best provides weak support for the hypothesis, because there are many other factors besides r-or K-selection that could be responsible for the patterns (Boyce, 1984; Pianka, 1970, p. 596; Stearns, 1977) . In view of the lack of evidence for the hypothesized relationship between independent and dependent variables (Boyce, 1984; Ricklefs, 1990) after 20 years of investigation by ecologists, we should view Rushton's approach with considerable skepticism. In addition, as we shall see below, the predictions that follow from the little ecological information Rushton has about ancestral populations of the racial groups actually are contradicted by his data.
Readers should bear in mind that, when Rushton labels patterns of life history characteristics as "r-selected" or "K-selected", he does so with no information about the independent variables (direct measures of the processes of r-selection or K-selection); he is assuming Pianka's hypothesis about r-and K-selection, instead of testing it.
Rushton's defense of his theoretical approach
How is it possible that Rushton's attempt to study r-and K-selection in humans is so far removed from the central concepts of those processes? This is an important question, because Rushton uses the context of theoretical ecology to lend an air of legitimacy to his racial comparisons. Readers of the psychological journals in which this work is published, who might otherwise be skeptical, might feel that they are in no position to question research that claims to be an application of evolutionary ecology. In the "Reply to Weizmann," Rushton discusses his theoretical approach. This discussion alone indicates a lack of familiarity with ecological thinking and scientific method in general, which is inconsistent with the extremely difficult ecological problem Rushton has chosen to investigate.
Even though the admission is fundamentally damaging to his uncritical assumption of Pianka's continuum, Rushton (this issue) acknowledges that ecologists do not agree on Pianka's formulation of the r/K model and that there are (many) 6ther hypothesized selection pressures on life history and personality traits. These other types of natural selection on life history and other traits include some that are also related to population parameters (e.g., alphaselection) and must be considered if one is to get a complete picture of evolutionary processes associated with population dynamics (Krebs, 1978) . If theoretical ecologists do not find the concepts of r-and K-selection straightforward, we might wonder whether this is the best area of ecology for psychologists to try to apply to human populations.
Further doubt is cast on Rushton's approach to evolutionary theory by his contention that "theories are not 'correct' or 'incorrect'". While it is true that we can never ultimately "prove" the truth of a theory or hypothesis, we can certainly show that one is incorrect by a number of means - (1) showing that it contains internal contradictions, (2) showing that one or more of its important assumptions is false, (3) showing that it is inconsistent with wellestablished theory, or (4) falsifying it with an empirical critical test. Pianka's (1970) continuum is immediately questionable on the issue of assumptions (Boyce, 1984) and internal consistency (Point 5 under "Implications...").
The fact that a theory or hypothesis can be intrinsically unsound implies that the choice of theoretical approach is important and that its choice is more than just a matter of taste, convenience, or "different perspectives". The problem becomes even more critical when the investigator is working outside his own field, for he is unlikely to appreciate the subtle ways in which hypotheses and models may differ. Rushton states that he chose Pianka's continuum on the basis of two apparently reasonable criteria. However, these two criteria have served him poorly. The first is a bad criterion for ecology in particular; the second actually provides grounds for rejection of the hypothesis Rushton has chosen, once we understand the processes r-and K-selection.
Rushton's first criterion: Simplicity of model
Rushton prefers "simple" models. Ironically, in ecology, the simpler the model appears, the more ecological sophistication is required to understand and apply it. Here is the reason: Ecological systems are never simple. They always involve a number of biological and physical processes that interact in complex ways. The only difference between a complex ecological model and a simple one is that the "complex" model makes explicit, and hence clear to everyone, the relationships and processes of the real system that are hypothesized to be relevant, while the "simple" one renders them invisible by making "simplifying" assumptions about them. Simple models will be successful only if their simplifying assumptions either match reality or are unimportant.
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with using a simple model as long as one is aware of the underlying ecological processes and simplifying assumptions that have been made, and checks their validity in every application of the simple model. However, in the case of "simple" hypotheses about r-and K-selection, even ecologists have been lax about keeping the processes and assumptions in mind (Boyce, 1984) .
Hypotheses about r-and K-selection have undergone several types of "simplification". First, theoreticians proposed a set of auxiliary independent variables (remember that the true independent variable is the degree of density dependence associated with the natural selection). These auxiliary independent variables included potentially quantifiable descriptors of environments, such as "predictability", and were assumed to be correlated with r-or K-selection. Often, additional assumptions were then made about the "predictability", say, of particular environments, such as mountaintops or the tropics. These layered assumptions, once made, often have been subsequently ignored by many ecologists, leading to confusion when the data do not fit the predictions of such "simple" hypotheses. The study of Zammuto and Millar (1986) , cited by Rushton, is a perfect example of such confusion. These authors, trying to rationalize why many predictions from "simplified" hypotheses about r-and K-selection were inconsistent with their data, discovered several incorrect assumptions that had gone untested for 20 years! (Zammuto & Millar, 1986 , pp. 1790 , 1791 . Pianka (1970) introduced another type of "simplification" to the world of hypotheses about r-and K-selection, one that was especially popular because it was proposed at a time when ecologists were anxious to achieve status as a "harder" science and so were particularly drawn to theoretical ideas that were elegant, simple, and general. As we have seen, in ecology these adjectives are usually synonymous with "requiring many assumptions".
Pianka assumed (1) that r-and K-selection would favour opposite traits (an assumption not made by the original model) and (2) that populations could respond to r-selection only through increased reproductive effort (an assumption especially unsuitable for humans). He composed a list of many life history and other characteristics that he predicted would be influenced in opposite directions under regimes of r-or K-selection. He thus hypothesized a unidimensional spectrum that ordered life history and other traits (excluding, notably, intelligence and rule-following).
In addition, by the time he had reached the end of his article, Pianka (1970, p. 596) had begun the unfortunate tradition of labeling sets of life history characteristics as "r-selected" or "Kselected" solely on the basis of where he had placed them on his hypothetical continuum, without any evidence that the processes of r-selection of K-selection had actually produced them. This tradition has permeated the ecological literature as well as Rushton's articles on racial comparisons, degenerating even to the point of using "r" and "K" as adjectives (e.g., ' 'The more K the family..." Rushton & Bogaert, 1987, p. 533) . It is careless usage and nearly always reflects a failure on the part of the author to remember that the relationship between population dynamics and organismal traits is one of several yet-unproven hypotheses, not a fact (Ricklefs, 1990) .
To understand how damaging this tradition has been to clear thinking in ecology, imagine the following analogous situation in psychology: Suppose that a hypothesis suggested that the type of school a person attended as a child would determine certain personality characteristics. Suppose that psychologists like the hypothesis, and without waiting for definitive empirical evidence, began labeling suites of personality characteristics as "public school educated" or "private school educated". Thus, rebellious people (say) would be labeled "public school educated" and ambitious people (say) would be labeled "private school educated" in psychological journals, without determining whether they really had gone to those types of schools. A researcher from outside the field, unfamiliar with the history of this usage, might conclude in good faith that public schooling produces rebellious behaviour when in fact the relationship between school type and personality was still only a hypothesis.
Not surprisingly, Pianka's formulation proved difficult to test rigorously because of its many implicit assumptions (Boyce, 1984) , and years of attempts to test it in the field revealed little empirical support for it in any case, especially within species (Stearns, 1977) . As Ricklefs (1990, p. 578) states: "Although the theory is plausible, a direct relationship between population growth rate or population fluctuations and life history characteristics has not been established". In summary, while ecologists are still interested in describing agents of natural selection as "r-or K-selecting", it is now recognized that these are only two of many dimensions that could be used to classify selective processes. They are far from being the all-encompassing explanation for variation in life histories, as Rushton assumes them to be.
Rushton's uncritical statement that vole population cycles result from dichotomous r-and Kselection leads us to a good example of the evolution of thinking among ecologists about natural selection on life history traits over the past 20 years. The paper cited, Krebs et al. (1973) , dates from the period when it was popular to try to interpret many variations in life history in terms of Pianka's unidimensional continuum. Further thinking and study of the complexity of selection on behavioural characteristics has caused Krebs to conclude that a population that declines rapidly in numbers, as vole populations do periodically, cannot by definition be K-selected. If it is useful to categorize the mode of selection in declining vole populations at all, it is more likely to be alphaselection (C. Krebs, pers. comm., September 1990) . Once again, we are left with the conclusion that a unidimensional continuum is a poor representation of multidimensional ecological processes.
Given the pitfalls of trying to use simple models that represent complex realities, the wisest choice for a non-ecologist trying to study humans is surely a model that requires relatively few assumptions and instead lays out the relevant ecological processes and relationships in quantifiable terms, as a reminder to the investigator of what he should be measuring.
Rushton's Second Criterion: Consistency with Data
Rushton's second criterion for choice of model is that the theory should fit the data. This criterion is reasonable, but in fact Rushton's data contradict the predictions that proceed from his own description of the ecological history of the races, in the key paragraphs in the "Reply to Weizmann et al." : "But why would Mongoloids have ended up the most K-selected?...". These paragraphs represent Rushton's only attempt to describe in ecological terms any process of r-or K-selection in humans. I will discuss them in some detail (1) because Rushton's assertions about the ancestral ecology of the races are almost completely undocumented, (2) because nearly every statement would be questioned by ecologists, (3) because the paragraphs' own internal contradictions demonstrate a fundamental failure to understand the processes of r-selection and K-selection, and (4) because Rushton's own descriptions of the ecology of ancestral populations imply that he has got the predictions exactly backward, if any generalizations could be made about current human races (which they cannot, see Point 3 under ' 'Implications...").
First, a meaningful answer to the question "But why would Mongoloids have ended up the most K-selected?..." must describe a process of Kselection. The answer should include the identification of an agent of natural selection and some indication of the density dependence of its action (its relationship to the parameter K). Rushton never mentions density-dependence, population dynamics, or environmental carrying capacity (K) in his answer to this question. Instead, he states that "Predictable environments are an ecological precondition for K-selection". This is incorrect, the citation of Weizmann et al. notwithstanding. The ecological sine qua non for K-selection is a history of some specific mode of density-dependent natural selection, which will occur when the population is at or close to environmental carrying capacity (K) (Boyce, 1984; MacArthur, 1962 MacArthur, , 1972 MacArthur & Wilson, 1967; Pianka, 1970) . In fact, Pianka (1970) , the source of Rushton's continuum, clearly includes "predictability" in his table not among the independent variables (which are the processes of r-and K-selection), but among the hypothesized correlates to be investigated! Environmental variability and predictability may well be correlated with r-, K-, or alpha-selection, or they may independently influence life history characteristics (e.g., Goodman, 1979; Hastings & Caswell, 1979; Murphy, 1968; Schaffer, 1974) but models of environmental predictability, like the r/K model, are yet to be thoroughly tested (Ricklefs, 1990) .
Second, Rushton apparently does not realize the complexity of the topic of environmental predictability. Zammuto and Millar (1985) , for example, list 18 different measures of predictability. The dozens of empirical and theoretical ecologists who have struggled for decades with the problems of defining, measuring, and theorizing about environmental variability and predictability would be astonished to find Pleistocene environments so easily characterized as "highly predictably harsh" (Asia), or "less predictable" (Africa) with no references or indication of how these concepts were defined or measured by Rushton.
Third, Rushton describes tropical savannahs (without references) as being characterized by "viral, bacterial, and parasitic diseases". Since endemic infectious diseases usually impose density-dependent mortality, they are generally agents of K-selection. Thus, Rushton's own suggested agents of natural selection on African populations imply that African populations have had a strong history of K-selection, as well as the r-selection implied by "droughts" (also undocumented). An ecologist would also want to compare quantitatively the degree of r-selection imposed on Negroid populations by Pleistocene African droughts, with the degree of r-selection imposed on Pleistocene Asian Mongoloid populations by bouts of unusually severe winter weather, or with the degree of r-selection imposed historically on Central American Mongoloid populations by devastating earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
Fourth, Rushton describes how Mongoloid populations "moved north". Indeed, Mongoloid populations have spent long periods of time invading new habitats -first Asia, then the Americas (Nelson & Jurmain, 1985) . Given that populations entering new habitats are freed for a time from density-dependent controls, they experience r-selection (Boyce, 1984; MacArthur, 1972; MacArthur & Wilson, 1967; Pianka, 1970; Ricklefs, 1990) . Therefore, the r/K model predicts that Mongoloid populations should have experienced strong r-selection in general, especially compared with African populations, which have been in the same place for at least 140,000 years. As Rushton's own arguments imply, African populations have had much more opportunity to approach their environmental carrying capacity and to experience K-selecting agents of natural selection, such as endemic infectious disease. In addition, Rushton lists many traits of Mongoloid peoples that are thought to represent adaptation to cold. Cold weather acts in a density-independent fashion (adaptations to cold improve survival in cold weather regardless of population density); cold weather is normally an agent of r-selection.
Thus, Rushton's claim about the empirical ordering of life history and behavioural traits in the racial groups exactly contradicts general predictions that follow from his own claims about their ancestral ecology and the r/K model (Boyce, 1984; MacArthur, 1972; MacArthur & Wilson, 1967; Pianka, 1970; Ricklefs, 1990, p. 577) . (Specific predictions from the model could be made only about individual populations after careful study in their historical habitat, as I have pointed out above).
The only ecological study cited by Rushton in these paragraphs is his statement that Zammuto and Millar (1985) demonstrated that many organisms "become more K-selected with increasing elevations and latitude" (Rushton, this issue). Zammuto and Millar actually found little support for predictions from several "simplified" hypotheses about r-and K-selection, and did not actually measure the process of Kselection at all. Once again, careless usage of the phrase "K-selected" to describe suites of organismal characteristics, rather than a process of density-dependent natural selection, indicates circular reasoning rather than support for Rushton's hypothesis.
Standards of investigation
Rushton complains of a "double standard" being applied to judgments of the quality of his research. If there is a double standard, it reflects common sense and careful science. There are several reasons why a research program like Rushton's requires unusually high standards of investigation. First, Rushton has undertaken to use an ecological model that demands considerable ecological sophistication for its proper application. Second, he has attempted to generalize his findings to large, widespread groups of humans. These characteristics render his research program articularly ambitious, and it demands correspondingly sophisticated research methods. The procedures suggested in Points 1 and 3 under "Implications for Rushton's research" are, in fact, minimal standards for the problem that Rushton has chosen. The design of his research does not meet these standards.
Rushton's choice of research demands high standards of investigation for a third reason as well. When research has the potential to be misused or to cause harm to people, it is perfectly appropriate to apply more stringent standards to its publication, as we do routinely in setting standards for drug testing or food preparation, depending on whether the product is to be used by humans or animals. Rushton himself does not deny that racial comparisons have in the past been abused. Contrary to Rushton's contention, however, it is generalizations about characteristics of visibly different or subordinate groups that lead to institutionalized violence and exploitation, not environmental or genetic arguments.
With these grave considerations in mind, investigators, reviewers, and editors have a special responsibility when dealing with research of this sort, to make sure that it is published only when it is of the highest quality. The job is all the harder when the research in question crosses disciplinary lines.
TROIS POINTS DE VUE CONCERNANT LES DIFFERENCES RACIALES RESUME
Les trois articles precedents traitent tous des points de vue controverses de J. Philippe Rushton concernant les differences raciales parmi les etres humains. Dans le premier article, Rushton repond a une attaque anterieure de sa theorie de la part de Wiezmann et ses collegues. Les deux autres articles sont des reponses a Rushton.
Selon Rushton, les ideaux democratiques sont compatibles avec la theorie de 1'evolution de Darwin, mais ces ideaux ne nous forcent pas a croire a l'uniformite biologique. II presente des donnees qui suggerent 1'existence de differences raciales en ce qui concerne la grandeur du cerveau, l'intelligence, le delai de maturation, la retenue sexuelle, le temperament, et 1'organisation sociale. Rushton divise son argument en deux sections principales: (1) donnees et (2) theorie.
En ce qui concerne les donnees, Rushton n'a recours qu'a son compte rendu d'etudes deja publiees, qui comprennent des donnees venant de l'Afrique, de l'Asie, de l'Europe et de l'Amerique du Nord. Ces donnees, selon Rushton, indiquent que pour un grand nombre de variables il existe une configuration precise ou Ton trouve les "Mongoloids" et les "Negroids" aux bouts opposes de la gamme et ou Ton trouve les "Caucasoids" a une position intermediate. II fait remarquer qu'il existe une variation considerable a l'interieur de chaque groupe. Rushton admet qu'il y a plusieurs sources d'erreur dans les donnees qu'il presente, mais il maintient qu'il n'a trouve aucune etude qui signale des resultats opposes a la configuration qu'il presente. II suggere que cette configuration est tellement stable qu'il est tres peu probable qu'elle puisse s'expliquer par des erreurs de mesure. Meme si des analyses subsequentes revelaient des sousgroupes qui ne se conformaient pas a la configuration generale, Rushton maintient qu'il ne serait pas logique de permettre a des cas isoles d'eclipser le general.
Rushton accuse les critiques tels que Weizmann et ses collegues de ne pas prendre en consideration les differences raciales en ce qui concerne le comportement sexuel. De telles differences ont des consequences graves selon Rushton qui constate que la predominance mondiale des maladies transmises sexuellement telles que la syphilis et le SIDA se conforme a la configuration a laquelle il fait souvent reference. En ce qui concerne le SIDA, Rushton dit que cette configuration se manifeste a la fois entre et a l'interieur des pays. En plus du comportement sexuel, Rushton discute la configuration raciale qu'il propose en ce qui concerne le crime, la fertilite humaine, la grandeur du cerveau et l'intelligence.
Se tournant vers la theorie, Rushton donne une explication de sa theorie r/K (r represente le taux d'augmentation maximum d'une population auquel contribue la reproduction prolifique; K represente le plus grand nombre d'organismes d'une espece qui peuvent se maintenir indefiniment dans une partie donnee de l'environnement). Les symboles r et K designent des differences entre la procreation et les soins des parents. Les huitres, qui produisent 500 million d'oeufe par an mais qui ne s'occupent aucunement de leur progeniture, servent d'exemple de la stategie r; les grands singes, qui ne produisent un enfant que tous les cinq ou six ans mais qui s'occupent beaucoup de leur progeniture, servent d'exemple de la strategic K. Les etres humains sont des strateges K mais, selon Rushton, il existe des differences r/K entre les especes, y compris entre les etres humains. En ce qui concerne la strategic K, il maintient que les "mongoloids" sont plus K que les "caucasoids" qui sont plus K que les "negroids". La theorie r/K predit les differences d'espacement entre les naissances, le nombre d'enfents, le taux de mortalite des enfants, la stabilite de la famille, la quantite de soins donnees par les parents, le poids a la naissance, la duree de la vie, l'intelligence, l'altruisme, et d'autres variables.
Rushton dit que son explication du comportement social est basee sur / 'influence genetique, pas sur le determinisme genetique. La disposition genetique et l'environnement agissent l'une sur l'autre. Neanmoins, il est important d'etudier les influences biologiques aussi bien que celles de l'environnement, meme au risque d'offenser la sensibilite politique.
En reponse, Weizmann et ses collegues mettent en question la facon dont Rushton se sert de sa theorie r/K. Us ne contestent pas l'emploi de cette theorie en tant qu'heuristique, mais ils critiquent les versions de la theorie qui relient la Canadian Psychology/Psychologie canadienne, 1991, 32:1 61 selection naturelle aux traits genotypiques specifiques. Us maintiennent que la maniere dont Rushton aborde la theorie r/K mene a des predictions arbitraires et necessite une attribution idiosyncratique du statut r/K a des traits differents, tels que la criminalite et l'altruisme. Us mettent egalement en question la maniere dont Rushton se sert du concept de race dans sa division des etres humains en "Mongoloids", "Caucasoids" et "Negroids". Us citent certaines donnees qui indiquent que la variation entre les races s'eleve a moins d'un septieme de la variation a l'interieur des groupes. II y a, par exemple, plus de variation genetique a l'interieur de la population africaine du sud du Sahara qu'il n'y a a l'interieur de toute autre population humaine. Ainsi, si on fait des classements selon la race, on devrait considerer les Africains comme un groupe de races plutot qu'un seul groupe racial. (1) specifier une population locale bien definie; (2) comprendre la dynamique de sa population dans le cadre de l'habitat ou Ton pense que la selection naturelle a eu lieu; (3) identifier les agents de la selection naturelle et les relier de maniere precise au modele de la selection r/K; (4) mettre a l'epreuve les predictions concernant les effets de ces agents de selection naturelle sur des caracteristiques particulieres de l'histoire d'une vie.
Anderson pretend que Rushton n'a suivi aucune de ces etapes dans aucun de ses articles sur les differences raciales et le modele r/K. Finalement, elle tente de demontrer que meme si Rushton abandonnait toute pretention a la legitimite evolutionnaire, les defauts empiriques de sa position resteraient. Elle maintient qu'un programme de recherche tel que celui de Rushton necessite des exigences d'enquete anormalement elevees pour deux raisons: afin que le modele ecologique dont Rushton se sert soit convenablement applique il faut une sophistication ecologique considerable et Rushton a tente de generaliser ses resultats a des groupes humains tres grands et tres etendus. Elle trouve que le dessein de ses recherches n'est pas a la hauteur des exigences requises.
